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I. INTRODUCTION
In June 2020, a group of Korean pop music (“K-Pop”) fans mobilized
on TikTok, a popular social media platform for sharing short videos, and
pranked former President Donald Trump’s campaign by reserving tickets en
masse for his rally in Tulsa, Oklahoma without showing up.1 A week later,
only 6,000 people showed up in the 19,000-seat stadium used by the
campaign.2 Two months later in August, Trump issued an executive order,
directing the Commerce Department to ban TikTok in the United States
(“TikTok Ban”).3
While federal officials cited national security risks as the reason for
issuing the order,4 few gave credence to the justifications. Some suggested
that the former President wanted to force TikTok’s Chinese parent to sell the
popular platform to an American company;5 others cited it as another
example of his political war against China;6 a few of TikTok stars even
suggested that the ban was a revenge for their pranks and trolls of Trump on
the platform.7
Notwithstanding the justifications, the TikTok ban was blocked by
federal courts in late September 2020 and rescinded by the Biden
Administration in June 2021.8 A similar ban on the Chinese social media
platform WeChat (“WeChat ban”) announced in conjunction with the
TikTok ban was also blocked by a federal court in September 2020 and
rescinded in June 2021.9 Despite the legal setbacks and regime change, the
social media bans, associated executive actions and court decisions have
wide-ranging implications beyond TikTok and WeChat.

1. See Barbara Ortutay, Did TikTok Teens, K-Pop Fans Punk Trump’s Comeback Rally?, AP NEWS
(June 21, 2020), https://apnews.com/article/2f18f18a8b40a4635fd3590fd159241c.
2. See id.
3. See Exec. Order No. 13,943, 85 Fed. Reg. 48641 (Aug. 6, 2020) [hereinafter WeChat Order];
Exec. Order No. 13,942, 85 Fed. Reg. 48637 (Aug. 6, 2020) [hereinafter TikTok Order].
4. See, e.g., Charles Creitz, Pompeo Warns of Potential Restriction of Chinese TikTok App; US
Users May Be Ceding Info to ‘Chinese Communists’, FOX NEWS (July 6, 2020),
https://www.foxnews.com/media/mike-pompeo-tik-tok-china-communist-social-media-spying-foxingraham.
5. See Abram Brown, Is This the Real Reason Why Trump Wants To Ban TikTok?, FORBES (Aug.
1, 2020), https://www.forbes.com/sites/abrambrown/2020/08/01/is-this-the-real-reason-why-trumpwants-to-ban-tiktok/?sh=10ff128b4aed; Alex Wilhelm, Trump Calls TikTok a Hot Brand, Demands a
Chunk of Its Sale Price, TECHCRUNCH (Aug. 3, 2020), https://techcrunch.com/2020/08/03/trump-callstiktok-a-hot-brand-demands-a-chunk-of-its-sale-price/.
6. See Brett Goodin, Banning TikTok and Stoking Sinophobia Isn’t Likely to Get Trump Re-Elected,
WASH. POST (Aug. 10, 2020), https://www.washingtonpost.com/outlook/2020/08/10/banning-tiktokstoking-sinophobia-isnt-likely-reelect-trump/.
7. See President Trump – TikTok Trolls Say He Want Revenge … Mad About Pranks!!!, TMZ (Aug.
6, 2020), https://www.tmz.com/2020/08/06/donald-trump-tiktok-ban-trolls-take-responsibility-tulsapranks-china/.
8. See infra Part II(4).
9. See id.
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Against the backdrops of a series of actions taken by the Trump
Administration to curb foreign access to the U.S. internet, communication
and telecommunication sectors (internet sector), citing national security
threats posed by foreign adversaries like China, Russia, Iran and others,10 the
TikTok and WeChat bans highlighted the emerging role economic security
issue plays in the broader national security debate, crystalized the breath and
limit of the Executive Branch’s policymaking authorities at the intersection
of national security and digital economy, and provided meaningful lessons
for policymakers and industry players alike as they adapt to the everchanging landscape of cybersecurity threats.
This paper surveys new trends on the broader national security policy
changes on foreign-owned Telecommunication, Media and Technology
(“TMT”) companies, platforms, applications and contents, and explore how
the court decisions and administrative actions surrounding the TikTok and
WeChat bans would shape future government actions in this area.11

II. MAJOR NATIONAL SECURITY REGIMES & RECENT CHANGES
Because of development of digital convergence, regulations over
foreign access to the U.S. TMT sector have undergone significant changes
over the past few decades, including increasing overlaps between regulations
over corporate entities, hardwares, content and platforms.12 Traditionally,
foreign entities that operate in the U.S. market face many regulations,
including market access limits (such as FCC licensing requirements).13
However, as cutting-edge technologies, such as artificial intelligence and
cloud computing, are increasingly used by industrial players in this sector,
these entities start to also face headwinds from government regulations over
technology concerns. The increased awareness and recognition of privacy as
a national security concern also brings regulations over access to U.S. user
data into the forefront of regulators’ minds in this sector, with special
emphasis in investment and market access limit.14

10. See, e.g., Tim Starks, Russia, China and Iran Trying to Hack Presidential Race, Microsoft says,
POLITICO (Sept. 10, 2020), https://www.politico.com/news/2020/09/10/russia-china-iran-cyberhack2020-election-411853; OFF. OF DIR. OF NAT’L INTEL., ANNUAL THREAT ASSESSMENT OF THE U.S.
INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY 8-14 (2021).
11. These government restrictions on foreign social media companies, platforms, applications and
contents tend to focus on two sides of the issues: foreign access to US data and technologies, and US user
access to foreign platforms. However, as government restrictions are primarily executed in the forms of
market access restrictions and investment limits, the practical impact of these restrictions on the two sides
of the issues are almost the same—limiting or eliminating U.S. user access to foreign-managed platforms
and content inside the United States.
12. See Natalie Klym & David D. Clark, The Impact of Application Convergence on Regulation:
The Case of Social Media, SSRN (Mar. 16, 2018).
13. See, e.g., Rules and Policies on Foreign Participation in the U.S. Telecommunications Market,
62 Fed. Reg. 64741 (Dec. 9, 1997) (to be codified at 47 C.F.R. pts. 43, 63, 64).
14. See 50 U.S.C. § 4565 (2021).
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A. ACCESS TO TECHNOLOGIES
Foreign persons are limited in their ability to acquire, use, or develop
technologies with U.S. content by national security and foreign policy
concerns. Export control, economic sanctions, and foreign investment
review laws and regulations restricts the transfer of technologies between
foreign persons and U.S. persons. Because of the close nexus between TMT
platforms and emerging technologies, such as AI, machine learning and clout
computing, recent regulatory reforms have significant potential implications.
Import-export regulations play a major role in limiting foreign access
to U.S. technologies. The Constitution does not provide a right of export for
individuals and businesses.15 As such, the Federal Government has broad
power in regulating transports of goods and services. The U.S. export control
regimes are primary comprised of the Export Administration Regulations
(EAR), 16 concerning export of goods that can be used for both military and
civil purposes, the International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR), 17
concerning with export of military and defense equipment, and Office of
Foreign Asset Control (OFAC) regulations,18 concerning financial and trade
embargoes and sanctions.
Traditionally, export control regulations have narrow speech
implications in the First Amendment context, except in the rare cases of
export of technical data or technical assistance under ITAR, and export of
software and source codes under EAR.19 Besides, export control legislations
and regulations provide for carve-outs for First Amendment activities,
including public domain exceptions and exemptions for core First
Amendment activities, such as academic research and education activities.20
However, in 2018, 30 years after the original authorizing legislation was
passed and 17 years after the statutory authority for the export control system

15.
16.
17.
18.
19.

See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 2.
See 15 C.F.R. §§ 730–74 (2021).
See 22 C.F.R. §§ 120–30 (2021).
See 31 C.F.R. §§ 501–98 (2021).
See BUREAU OF INDUS. & SEC., U.S. DEP’T OF COM., ENCRYPTION AND EXPORT
ADMINISTRATION REGULATIONS (EAR) (2021).
20. Export control regulations have not been without First Amendment challenges. See Bernstein v.
U.S. Dep’t of Just., 176 F.3d 1132 (9th Cir. 1999), rehearing granted and opinion withdrawn, 192 F.3d
1308 (9th Cir. 1999) (en banc) (challenging EAR regulating software); United States v. Edler Indus., Inc.,
579 F.2d 516 (9th Cir. 1978) (challenging ITAR regulating technical assistance). Statutory and regulatory
provisions do provide some carve-outs due to First Amendment concerns. See, e.g., 15 C.F.R. §§ 734.2,
734.4(b)(1)(i), 734.7. However, the outdated languages in the public domain exceptions may not be able
to meet the evolving landscape of First Amendment activities, or could have chilling effects if applied in
some contexts of export and trade enforcement actions. See International Traffic in Arms: Revisions to
Definitions of Defense Services, 80 Fed. Reg. 31525, 31527 (proposed June 3, 2015) (to be codified at
22 C.F.R. pt. 120, 123, 125, 127); Doron Hindin et al., The Role of Export Controls in Regulating Dual
Use Research of Concern: Striking a Balance between Freedom of Fundamental Research and National
Security, 2017 NAT’L ACADS. PRESS 17 (2017).
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lapsed for the third time,21 Congress enacted the Export Control Reform Act
(ECRA) to reauthorize the EAR and expand the purview of the EAR to cover
emerging and foundational technologies.22 This expansion expands the scope
of the EAR and requires the Commerce Department to regularly update
technologies subject to export control, 23 including in response to national
security threats in the internet sector.24 The ECRA also made it explicit that
it cannot be used to directly or indirectly regulate personal communication,
an exception it incorporated form the International Economic Emergency
Powers Act (IEEPA).25
Both the Trump and Biden Administrations have been slow in enacting
regulations to expand the scope of the EAR as authorized by Section 1758
of the ECRA, given the shifting and complex nature of defining the
regulatory scope and providing the right level of limit on accessing these
intangible goods and services.26
In addition to the explicit regulation of software under export control
measures,27 which is a regulation of speech,28 the terms of emerging
technologies encompass a variety of identified technologies used for
personal communications, including AI cloud technologies, Position,
Navigation, and Timing (PNT) technologies, and speech and audio

21. See CHRISTOPHER A. CASEY ET AL., CONG. RSCH. SERV., THE INTERNATIONAL EMERGENCY
ECONOMIC POWERS ACT: ORIGINS, EVOLUTION, AND USE 47 (2020).
22. See Export Control Reform Act of 2018, Pub. L. No. 115-232, 132 Stat. 1636, 2208 (2018)
(codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. §§ 4801-4852) [hereinafter “ECRA”]. ECRA closed a long-standing
gap identified by many national security observers—that the U.S. export control system does not direct
regulate technology or the transfer of know-how. See U.S. CONG. OFF. OF TECH. ASSESSMENT, SCIENCE,
TECHNOLOGY, AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT 49 (1988) (citing the Bucy Report to find that “the
knowledge most vital to protect is not embedded in military weaponry per se, but knowledge that conveys
design and manufacturing know-how”); see also Scott Jones, Disrupting Export Controls: “Emerging
and Foundational Technologies” and Next Generation Controls, 6 STRATEGIC TRADE REV. 31, 36 (2020)
(arguing that ECRA reflects a shifted approach identified and recommended in the Bucy Report).
23. See Scott A. Jones, Trading Emerging Technologies: Export Controls Meet Reality, 31 SEC. &
HUMAN RTS. (SPECIAL ISSUE) 47 (2020).
24. See Jeffrey Richardson, Is Your Software Transmission Subject to U.S. Export Controls under
the EAR?, MILLER CANFIELD (May 3, 2013), https://www.millercanfield.com/resources-alerts-845.html.
25. See ECRA, supra note 22, at § 1754.
26. Some limited regulations have been published. For example, under the emerging technology
rules, many provisions touch on issues related to the First Amendment. For example, in Category 3,
“software” related to EUV-Lithography has been classified for control, as well as “software” related to
surveillance in Category 5; in Category 2, 3D printing machines have been added. However, the
government has not acted on foundational technologies. See Implementation of Certain New Controls on
Emerging Technologies, 85 Fed. Reg. 62583 (Oct. 5, 2020) (to be codified at 15 C.F.R. pts. 740, 772,
774); U.S. DEP’T OF COM., SECRETARY ROSS HIGHLIGHTS COMMERCE ACTIONS SUPPORTING STRATEGY
FOR CRITICAL AND EMERGING TECHNOLOGIES (2020); Identification and Review of Controls for Certain
Foundational Technologies, 85 Fed. Reg. 52934 (proposed Aug. 27, 2020) (to be codified at 15 C.F.R. at
pts. 742, 774).
27. See 31 C.F.R. §§ 501–98 (2021).
28. See, e.g., Bernstein v. U.S. Dep’t of Just., 176 F.3d 1132, 1140–41 (9th Cir. 1999), rehearing
granted and opinion withdrawn, 192 F.3d 1308 (9th Cir. 1999); Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Corley,
273 F.3d 429, 445–46 (2d Cir. 2001).
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processing technologies, which have been considered to be regulated under
the emerging technology rules.29 A variety of TMT companies can be subject
to export control for its use of emerging and foundational technologies.30 For
example, some have called for ByteDance, TikTok’s Chinese parent
company, to be added to the “entity list”, which would essentially ban any
US companies from transacting with ByteDance or TikTok. 31 Practical
consequences would include delisting the app from Android and Apple app
stores, or prohibiting US users to access to app in certain networks.32 A TMT
company under an export control ban, as in the case of mobile device
producer Huawei, who is forced to sell its entire mobile device business,33
can have devastating impact its livelihood.34
Alternatively, the foreign investment review regime, the Committee on
Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS), also provides broad
authority for the Federal Government to review transactions by foreign
corporations to acquire U.S. assets and businesses involving sensitive
personal data,35 critical infrastructure (including telecommunication
networks),36 and critical technologies (including emerging and foundational

29. See Review of Controls for Certain Emerging Technologies, 83 Fed. Reg. 58201 (Nov. 19, 2018)
(to be codified at 15 C.F.R. pt. 744).
30. Cf. Natasha Moore & Brian Mich, Export Controls Become New Stick in US-China Tech Race,
FORBES (Dec. 15, 2020), https://www.forbes.com/sites/riskmap/2020/12/15/export-controls-becomenew-stick-in-us-china-tech-race/?sh=ffe8341669a0.
31. See Adi Robertson, How the Trump Administration Could “Ban” TikTok, THE VERGE (Aug. 1,
2020),
https://www.theverge.com/2020/7/9/21315983/trump-pompeo-ban-tiktok-bytedance-chinesesocial-media-national-security-censorship-methods.
32. New smartphones produced by Huawei, a Chinese company added to the entity list, were unable
to install Android operating system or update such system, absent exemptions provided by the Commerce
Department. See id. As for the blocking of use of an application in a WiFi network, the University of
Kansas blocked using of WeChat on its school-provided WiFi network, after the WeChat ban was
announced. See Blake Ullmann & Nicole Dolan, KU-owned Computers, Campus Wi-Fi Will Ban Use of
WeChat, THE UNIV. DAILY KANSAN (Sept. 15, 2020), https://www.kansan.com/news/ku-ownedcomputers-campus-wi-fi-will-ban-use-of-wechat/article_0d3326b8-f76b-11ea-bd4cdbb1fe3ba1be.html.
33. See Julie Zhu, Exclusive: Huawei to Sell Phone Unit for $15 Billion to Shenzhen Government,
Digital
China,
Others
Sources,
REUTERS
(Nov.
9,
2020,
9:05
PM),
https://www.reuters.com/article/huawei-m-a-digital-china-exclusive/exclusive-huawei-to-sell-phoneunit-for-15-billion-to-shenzhen-government-digital-china-others-sources-idUSKBN27Q0HJ.
34. Therefore, it is not surprising that the key AI algorithms, which powered TikTok towards its
success, was a main sticking point for the CFIUS negotiation. See Zoe Schiffer, The Big Questions Behind
TikTok’s Looming National Security Investigation, THE VERGE (Nov. 7, 2019, 3:26 PM),
https://www.theverge.com/2019/11/7/20948613/tiktok-national-security-investigation-cfius-chinabytedance-hawley-rubio. The interesting issue, though, is that while TikTok’s Chinese parent,
ByteDance, owns the algorithms, its success in many sense was attributed towards its original acquisition
of China-headquarter, U.S.-based Music.ly. See id.
35. See 50 U.S.C. § 4565(a)(4)(B)(iii)(III) (2018).
36. See id. § 4565(a)(4)(B)(iii)(I); see also PROSKAUER ROSE LLP, CFIUS Proposed Rules Target
Critical Technology, Sensitive Personal Data & Real Estate (Oct. 4, 2019),
https://www.proskauer.com/alert/cfius-proposed-rules-target-critical-technology-sensitive-personaldata-and-real-estate.
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technologies).37 In 2018, Congress specifically passed the Foreign
Investment Risk Review Modernization Act (FIRRMA) to broaden the scope
of the review regime,38 including mandating the review of transactions
involving emerging and foundational technologies, as defined under
ECRA,39 and involving sensitive personal data.40 CFIUS may approve
transactions, enter into and enforce mitigation agreements, or recommend to
the President to block transactions, based on its review of the national
security implications of the transaction, without judicial review.41
B. ACCESS TO DATA
Foreign persons are also somewhat limited in their ability to acquire,
store, transfer and monetize personal data of U.S. persons. Measured by
many standards, U.S. lacks robust data security and privacy laws and
regulations, and existing laws and regulations are not often attached with
national security or foreign policy considerations.42 However, recent laws in
foreign investment review as well as regulatory actions taken in the
telecommunication sector, from which the TikTok and WeChat bans arise,
signal significant change in the Federal Government’s approach with regard
to privacy as a national security concern.
First, as provided before in this article, CFIUS is specifically authorized
under FIRRMA to review transactions that allow foreign access to “sensitive
personal data of United States citizens that may be exploited in a manner that
threatens national security.”43 In this context, CFIUS has blocked one
transaction involving a Chinese company’s attempted acquisition of a U.S.
company that develops and operates hotel booking and management
software, citing privacy concerns.44 But its most landmark decision arises
from forcing a Chinese private gaming company to divest ownership stake
from Grindr, the U.S.-based social media app popular in the LGBTQ

37. See 50 U.S.C. § 4565(a)(6)(A)(vi) (2018) (incorporating Section 1758 of the ECRA).
38. See Foreign Investment Risk Review Modernization Act of 2018, Pub. L. No. 115-232, 132 Stat.
1636, 2174 (2018).
39. See 50 U.S.C. § 4565(a)(6)(A)(vi) (2018).
40. See id. § 4565(a)(4)(B)(iii)(III).
41. See id. § 4565(i).
42. See Robert D. Williams, To Enhance Data Security, Federal Privacy Legislation Is Just a Start,
THE BROOKINGS INST. (Dec. 1, 2020), https://www.brookings.edu/techstream/to-enhance-data-securityfederal-privacy-legislation-is-just-a-start/.
43. See 50 U.S.C. § 4565(a)(4)(B)(iii)(III) (2018); see also Austin Mooney, Spotlight on Sensitive
Personal Data as Foreign Investment Rules Take Force, MCDERMOTT WILL & EMERY LLP (Feb. 18,
2020),
https://www.mwe.com/insights/spotlight-on-sensitive-personal-data-as-foreign-investmentrules-take-force/.
44. See Order of Mar. 6, 2020 Regarding the Acquisition of StayNTouch, Inc. by Beijing Shiji
Information Technology Co., Ltd., 85 Fed. Reg. 13719 (Mar. 10, 2020).
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communities,45 was the first reported CFIUS-blocked transaction in the TMT
sector.
In the telecommunication sector, the Federal Communication
Commission begins to play a more assertive role in national security arena
as well. First, it exercises broad licensing and transaction review authority
with regard to foreign telecommunication and communication providers.
The most famous example includes its blocking of China Telecom, a Chinese
state-owned telecommunication provider, from renewing its license to
operate in the United States.46 It also rejected an application from China
Mobile, another Chinese state-owned telecommunication provider, to
operate mobile networking services in the United States.47 Second, it has also
forced major telecommunication providers to move away from Huawei, a
major communication network service provider in the Midwest and a leading
5G hardware provider in the world.48 Under its newly acquired authority
under a 2019 law, the FCC may designate foreign companies who pose
national security threats to the U.S. communication networks, and may bar
U.S. companies from tapping an $8.3 billion government fund to purchase
equipment from the designated companies.49 Five Chinese companies,
including Huawei, have been added to the designation list.50 Last but not the
least, the FCC has formalized its Team Telecom regime to review national
security related threats in the telecommunication sectors,51 with a review and
approval process akin to the CFIUS process but limited to the
telecommunication sector.52
However, despite these significant actions, one of the most
consequential executive actions was former President Trump’s Executive
45. See Yuan Yang & James Fontanella-Khan, Grindr Sold by Chinese Owner After US National
Security Concerns, THE FIN. TIMES (Mar. 7, 2020), https://www.ft.com/content/a32a740a-5fb3-11ea8033-fa40a0d65a98.
46. See Matt Keeley, FCC Should Ban China Telecom Over National Security Risks, Justice
Department-Led Review Says, NEWSWEEK (Apr. 10, 2020, 12:48 AM), https://www.newsweek.com/fccshould-ban-china-telecom-over-national-security-risks-justice-department-led-review-says-1497222.
47. See China Mobile Int’l (USA) Inc., 34 FCC Rcd. 3361 (2019).
48. See Cecilia Kang, Huawei Ban Threatens Wireless Service in Rural Areas, N.Y. TIMES (May 25,
2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/05/25/technology/huawei-rural-wireless-service.html.
49. See Daniel Shepardson, Five Chinese Companies Pose Threat to U.S. National Security: FCC,
REUTERS (Mar. 12, 2021, 10:13 AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-china-tech/five-chinesecompanies-pose-threat-to-u-s-national-security-fcc-idUSKBN2B42DW; see also FED. COMMC’N.
COMM’N, FCC Publishes List of Communications Equipment and Services That Pose a Threat to National
Security (Mar. 12, 2021), https://docs.fcc.gov/public/attachments/DOC-370755A1.pdf (citing Secure and
Trusted Communications Networks Act of 2019).
50. See Shepardson, supra note 49. The FCC has also created a reimbursement program for U.S.
companies to receive federal funding to switch from Chinese technologies and equipment to other those
provided by other vendors. See id.
51. See Farhad Jalinous et al., FCC Adopts New Rules and Procedures for Team Telecom Committee,
WHITE & CASE LLP (Oct. 21, 2020), https://www.whitecase.com/publications/alert/fcc-adopts-newrules-and-procedures-team-telecom-committee.
52. See Brian D. Weimer et al., Formalizing Team Telecom, THE NAT’L L. REV. (Oct. 20, 2020),
https://www.natlawreview.com/article/formalizing-team-telecom.
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Order 13873 (“ICT Supply Chain EO” or “EO”), which created an
independent, CFIUS-like review process in the TMT sector.
C. EXECUTIVE ORDER 13873
In May 2019, President Trump announced in the EO a one-year national
emergency under IEEPA, and authorized the Commerce Secretary to
promulgate rules, evaluate, make preliminary determinations, afford parties
opportunities to respond, and make final determinations, to prohibit, unwind
or mitigate a transaction involving Information and Communication
Technologies (“ICTs”), including hardware and software “primarily
intended to fulfill or enable function of information or data processing,
storage, retrieval, or communications by electronic means”,53 if the
transaction involves ICTs “designed, developed, manufactured, or supplied
by persons owned by, controlled by, or subject to the jurisdiction or direction
of a foreign adversary.”54 “Transactions” were defined to include “any
acquisition, importation, transfer, installation, dealing in or use of” ICTs55,
which is broader than the definition of “transaction” in the CFIUS context.56
Under the EO, any foreign country or entity can be designated as a foreign
adversary.57 In evaluating the proper remedy, the Secretary is entrusted to
engage in a three-factor analysis under Section 1(a)(ii).58
The EO has been invoked three times thereafter. First, it was cited as
the authority for the President to instruct the Commerce Secretary to block
TikTok and WeChat from the U.S. market.59 Second, in January 2021, the
Commerce Department proposed an interim final rule (“ICT Rule”) to
enforce the EO, which called for the authority to review any transaction
involving ICTs, including desktop, mobile, gaming and web-based software
used by more than 1 million U.S. persons within a 12 month period.60 Third,
the Commerce Department under the Biden Administration issued various
subpoena to Chinese companies to investigate alleged unfair practices under
the EO.61

53. See Exec. Order No. 13,873, 84 Fed. Reg. 22,689, 22,691 (May 17, 2019); Securing the
Information and Communications Technology, 84 Fed. Reg. 65,316, 65,320 (proposed Nov. 27, 2019)
(to be codified at 15 C.F.R. pt. 7).
54. See Exec. Order No. 13,873, 84 Fed. Reg. at 22,690.
55. See id. at 22,689.
56. See 50 U.S.C. § 4565(a)(4)(B) (2018).
57. See Exec. Order No. 13,873, 84 Fed. Reg. at 22,691.
58. See id. at 22,690.
59. See infra Part II(4).
60. See Securing the Information and Communications Technology and Services Supply Chain, 86
Fed. Reg. 4909, 4912 (Jan. 19, 2021) (to be codified at 15 C.F.R. pt. 7) (interim final rule).
61. See U.S. Subpoenas Chinese Communications Firms in Probe of National Security Risks
REUTERS (Mar. 17, 2021), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-china-commerce-idUSKBN2B92OH.
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Although the TikTok and WeChat bans have been blocked by courts
and rescinded by the Biden Administration, 62 the national emergency has
been extended by both administrations since 2019, and the Commerce
Department has finalized the ICT Rule in 2021.
D. TIKTOK AND WECHAT LITIGATIONS
In May 2020, the President extended the national emergency declared
under the ICT Supply Chain EO for one more year.63 Three months later, the
President issued a pair of new Executive Orders (“blocking orders”)
directing the Commerce Secretary to block transactions involving WeChat,
the messaging app owned by private Chinese company Tencent, and TikTok,
the video sharing app owned by private Chinese company ByteDance.64 The
blocking orders cite to authority granted to the Secretary under the EO as
well as delegated authority granted to the President in times of national
economic emergency under IEEPA.65
Under the WeChat blocking order, WeChat “threatens to allow the
Chinese Communist Party access to Americans’ personal and proprietary
information” and “captures the personal and proprietary information of
Chinese nationals visiting the United States, thereby allowing the Chinese
Communist Party a mechanism for keeping tabs on Chinese citizens who
may be enjoying the benefits of a free society for the first time in their
lives.”66 The Secretary therefore was authorized pursuant to the delegated
authority under IEEPA and the ICT Supply Chain EO to identify and block
“any transaction that is related to WeChat by any person” or related to
Tencent or its identified subsidiaries beginning on the 45 days after the issue
date of the blocking order.67 Under the blocking order, any evasive
transactions and conspiracies formed to violate the order would also be
blocked.68 The blocking order made clear that it applies to any persons and
entities subject to the jurisdiction of the United States.69 On the same day,
another order blocking TikTok was issued with similar rationale and
delegation of authorities.70
On September 17, 2020, the Commerce Department issued the list of
prohibited transactions against WeChat, including provision for download or
62. See infra Part II(4).
63. Continuation of the National Emergency with Respect to Securing the Information and
Communications Technology and Services Supply Chain, 85 Fed. Reg. 29321 (May 13, 2020).
64. Exec. Order Banning WeChat From the U.S., 85 Fed. Reg. 48641 (Aug. 6, 2020); Exec. Order
Banning TikTok From the U.S., 85 Fed. Reg. 48637 (Aug. 6, 2020).
65. Exec. Order Banning WeChat From the U.S.,85 Fed. Reg. at 48642; Exec. Order Banning
TikTok From U.S., 85 Fed. Reg. at 48637.
66. Exec. Order Banning WeChat From the U.S.,85 Fed. Reg. 48641.
67. Id.
68. Id.at 48642.
69. Id.
70. See Exec. Order Banning TikTok from the U.S., 85 Fed. Reg. 48637.
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update in app store, providing internet hosting, content delivery, internet
transit or peering services for the app, use of the app for financial transaction,
use of the app in functioning of other software or apps. 71 The prohibited
transactions would be effectively on September 20. On September 24, the
Department announced an almost identical list of prohibitions for TikTok,
although it does not include a financial transaction ban because of the lack
of a e-payment function on TikTok.72 The delisting requirement would
become effective on September 27, and the remaining provisions would
become effective on November 12.73
On August 21, a groups of WeChat users sued the Government before
the U.S. District Court in the North District of California, alleging
Administrative Procedures Act (APA), IEEPA, First Amendment and Fifth
Amendment challenges and asking for injunctive relief (“WeChat case”).74
The district court took two days to review the Commerce Department list
and entered a preliminary injunction about 15 hours before the ban was
supposed to become effective, rejecting other challenges but finding that the
ban was violating the First Amendment against prior restraint, or was a
overbroad time, place, manner (TPM) restriction.75
On September 18, TikTok and ByteDance filed suit in the District of
Columbia, similarly asserting APA, First Amendment and Fifth Amendment
challenges (“TikTok case”).76 On the same day, a group of three TikTok
influencers filed suit in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania with similar
statutory and constitutional challenges (“Marland case”).77 On September
27, a D.C. federal judge granted a preliminary injunction on the delisting
requirement for TikTok, finding the government acted ultra vire under the
APA and IEEPA’s personal communication exception.78 On October 30, the
District Court in Philadelphia granted another injunction on all transactions
for the influencers, similarly finding that the government action was ultra

71. U.S. DEP’T OF COM., Identification of Prohibited Transactions to Implement Executive Order
13943 and Address the Threat Posed by WeChat, 15 CFR Ch. 7 (Sept. 17, 2020) (updated on Sept. 21,
2020) (notice was withdrawn from Federal Register after court order precluding the notice from going
into effect).
72. See U.S. DEP’T OF COM., Notice of E.D. Pa. Preliminary Injunction on the Identification of
Prohibited Transactions with TikTok, 15 CFR Ch. 7 (Nov. 9, 2020); see also Identification of Prohibited
Transactions with TikTok, 85 Fed. Reg. 60061 (Sept. 24, 2020) (enjoined by court from going into effect).
73. Exec. Order Banning WeChat From the U.S., 85 Fed. Reg. 48641 (Aug. 6, 2020).
74. Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at 4-6, U.S. WeChat Users All. v. Trump, 488
F. Supp. 3d 912 (N.D. Cal. 2020).
75. See Motion for Preliminary Injunction, WeChat, 488 F. Supp. 3d 912 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 19, 2020).
76. Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, TikTok Inc. v. Trump, 490 F. Supp. 3d 73
(D.D.C. Sept. 18, 2020).
77. Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at 1-3, Marland v. Trump, 108 Fed. R. Serv. 3d
283 (E.D. Pa. 2020).
78. See TikTok v. Trump, 490 F. Supp.3d 73, 85-86 (D.D.C. Sept. 27, 2020).
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vire.79 And on December 7, the same D.C. District judge blocked the
remaining transactions again in the suit brought forth by TikTok.80
At the waning days of the Trump Administration, the Government
appealed all three injunctions.81 The Ninth Circuit and the D.C. Circuit held
oral arguments, but no appellate decision was issued.82 Both appellate courts
sounded skeptical of the Government’s arguments,83 and the Ninth Circuit
denied to stay the injunction issued by the lower court.84 With the Biden
Administration’s decision to rescind both bans, all court proceedings were
later dismissed.85

III. WECHAT, THE FIRST AMENDMENT AND NATIONAL SECURITY
The immediate impact of the WeChat litigation is different from the two
decisions in TikTok and Marland, because WeChat was decided on First
Amendment grounds, while TikTok and Marland were decided on narrower
statutory grounds under IEEPA and APA. This section will discuss WeChat
first, as the district court in that case directly weighed the Government’s
proffered national security concerns. The section will conclude with a
broader discussion on the Government’s approach in initiating the bans and
in contesting these set of litigations.
In WeChat, while the district court did not reject the proffered reasoning
of national security interests, it held, in the decision granting the injunction
(“WeChat I”), that the speech interests are simply too significant, that there
were no alternative channels of speech, and that the government’s ban was
simply too overbroad to succumb those speech interests to the government
ban.86 Additionally, the court later in a motion to stay the injunction
(“WeChat II”) examined the alternative government actions the Commerce
Department considered, and concluded that the government failed to
advance a narrowly tailored TPM regulation.87

79. Marland v. Trump, 498 F. Supp. 3d 624, 625 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 20, 2020).
80. See TikTok v. Trump, 507 F. Supp 3d 92, 92 (D.D.C. Dec. 7, 2020).
81. See Notice of Appeal, U.S. WeChat All. v. Trump, No. 20-16908 (9th Cir. 2020); Notice of
Appeal, Marland v. Trump, No. 20-3322 (3d Cir. 2020); Notice of Appeal, TikTok v. Trump, No. 2005302 (D.C. Cir. 2020).
82. See Notice of Appeal, WeChat, No. 20-16908 (9th Cir. 2020); Notice of Appeal, TikTok, No. 2005302 (D.C. Cir. 2020).
83. See Edvard Petterson, WeChat Ban Urged by U.S. Gets Skeptical Review by Appellate Court,
BLOOMBERG (Jan. 14, 2021), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2021-01-14/wechat-ban-urgedby-u-s-gets-skeptical-review-by-appeals-court; D.C. Circuit Skeptical of Trump Claims on TikTok
Security Risks, LAW 360 (Dec. 14, 2020), https://www.law360.com/articles/1337489/dc-circ-skepticalof-trump-claims-on-tiktok-security-risks.
84. Nicholas Iovino, WeChat Ban Will Stay on Hold, Ninth Circuit Rules, COURTHOUSE NEWS SERV.
(Oct. 26, 2020), https://www.courthousenews.com/wechat-ban-will-stay-on-hold-ninth-circuit-panelrules/.
85. See infra footnote 112.
86. U.S. WeChat All. v. Trump, 488 F. Supp. 3d 912, 927-28 (N.D. Cal. 2020).
87. U.S. WeChat All. v. Trump, 2020 WL 6891820, at *1, *8-9 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 24, 2020).
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A. WECHAT I
In WeChat I, the court, applying jurisprudence on prior restraints and
content-neutral restrictions, blocked the government’s actions. Specifically,
the court granted the preliminary injunction against the WeChat ban based
on two defects in the government action: first, the ban amounts to a prior
restraint analogous to the ban of signposting in City of Ladue v. Gilleo
(1994);88 second, even if the ban is only a TPM restriction, it is too overbroad
to survive intermediate scrutiny.89
In considering the second issue on content-neutral restrictions (or TPM
restrictions), courts must first weigh the significance of the government
interests unrelated to the content the speech.90 Then, it must consider the
relatedness between the government interest raised and the measure
adopted.91 Lastly, courts consider on whether the government restriction
leaves open adequate alternative channels of communication.92 Some have
framed the narrow tailoring test—in combination of the second and third
prongs of the test—as essentially requiring that the government restrictions
are “no more burdensome than necessary” to advance the government
interests at stake.93 Courts therefore weigh the government’s justification
against its own action to see if those government interests would be
substantially advanced by the restrictions.
In the blocking order, the government identified several national
security risks at issue. It argues that the application allows the Chinese
Government to: (1) access Americans’ personal and proprietary information,
(2) surveil Chinese citizens who are enjoying the benefit of a free society for
the first time in their lives in the United States, (3) censor content that it
deems politically sensitive, and (4) create disinformation campaigns that
benefit itself.94 In its court filings before the WeChat I decision, the
government reiterates the same four interests at stake.95
However, while WeChat I admitted the overarching national security
interests at stake and identified risks, it noted that the government “put in

88. City of Laude et al v. Gilleo, 512 U.S. 43, 54-59 (1994).
89. See WeChat, 488 F. Supp. 3d at 927.
90. See Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989).
91. Intermediate
Scrutiny,
CORNELL
LAW
SCH.,
https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/intermediate_scrutiny (last visited Apr. 6, 2021).
92. See Pac. Coast Horseshoeing Sch., Inc. v. Kirchmeyer, 961 F.3d 1062, 1073 n.9 (9th Cir. 2020).
93. See, e.g., Doe v. Prosecutor, Marion County, 705 F.3d 694, 698 (7th Cir. 2013); Joel Alicea &
John D. Ohlendorf, Against the Tiers of Constitutional Scrutiny, 41 NAT’L AFFS. 72, 72-73 (2019).
94. See Addressing the Threat Posed by WeChat, 85 Fed. Reg. 48641 (Aug. 11, 2020).
95. See Opp’n to Mot. for Prelim. Inj. at 26, U.S. WeChat Users All. v. Trump, 488 F. Supp. 3d 912
(N.D. Cal. Sep. 19, 2020) (No. 20-cv-05910-LB),ECF No. 22 (the Executive Order was enacted to
“prevent [] the Chinese Government from using WeChat to surveil the American people, censor
information, sow misinformation, and collect and use ‘vast swaths of personal and proprietary
information from American users to advance its own interests.”); see also Opp’n to Renewed Mot. for
Prelim. Inj., at 7–8, WeChat, 488 F. Supp. 3d 912 (No. 20-cv-05910-LB),ECF No. 51.
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scant little evidence” that an effective ban on all U.S. WeChat users would
be necessary to address those risks.96 It also suggested the alternatives, such
as barring WeChat from government devices and taking industry best
practices on data security, may be sufficient.97 The court eventually settled
on two points to rule against the government: first, the ban restricted more
speech than is necessary, and second, the ban did not give substitute channels
of communication.98
B. WECHAT II
In subsequent filings before the WeChat II decision, the government
furnished a memorandum provided by John K. Costello, Deputy Assistant
Secretary for Intelligence and Security, to Secretary Ross, in which he
expanded on the national security threats at issue: (1) “[t]he PRC presents a
national security, foreign policy, and economic threat to the United States
given its long-term effort to conduct espionage against the U.S. government,
corporations, and persons”, (2) “[t]he CCP exerts influence over private
Chinese companies such as Tencent and its employees through direct ties to
personnel and corporate ‘Party Committees’”, (3) “PRC Law Requires that
Companies Subject to PRC Jurisdiction, such as Tencent, assist with
PRCISS intelligence and surveillance efforts”, and (4) “Tencent has
complied with and assisted the PRC with its domestic and global
monitoring”.99
After laying out WeChat’s vulnerabilities, such as storage of data on
Hong Kong servers, potential background roaming, access by law
enforcement agencies by request, and weak data protections, the memo
predicted several consequences for not restricting the use of WeChat: (1)
“Exploitation of WeChat user data imperils the privacy of U.S. citizens, the
security of U.S. government personnel, and, at scale, directly threatens the
economic security and national security of the United States”, (2)
“Exploitation of WeChat for censorship or propaganda for U.S.-based users
directly threatens U.S. national security by surreptitiously influencing U.S.
public opinion to those that align with Chinese government objectives.”100
The memo went on to suggest that Tecent’s proposal to create a separate
U.S. version of the app, with U.S.-government approved governance
structure, a U.S.-based cloud provider, security measures to protect new
source code, and regular audits and approvals over source code and data
access, was not enough. It suggested that a “baseline level of trust” in the

96. 488 F. Supp. 3d 912, at 927.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 928.
99. Notice of Corrected Ex. in Support of Mot. to Stay, Ex. A, WeChat, 488 F. Supp. 3d 912 (No.
3:20-cv-05910-LB), ECF. No. 76-1.
100. Id.
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parent company will be needed for any mitigation plan, but the government
cannot trust Tencent to retain ownership interests in the app due to its close
relationship with the Chinese government.101
In WeChat II, the court rejected the government motion to stay, finding
that its consideration of the narrowly tailoring prong of the test remained the
same. Specifically, the court rejected the government action for its failure to
consider alternatives than a total ban, citing two alternatives: first, it cited a
measure recommended by the Department of Homeland Security but
rejected by the Department of Commerce—to ban WeChat on government
devices; second, it suggested that the government could also adopt data
security mitigation plans proposed by Tencent and a former Motorola
executive (furnished by the plaintiffs) which are consistent with industry best
practices.102
C. BROADER IMPLICATIONS
The back-and-forth between the government and the court reflects two
central themes of arguments.
First, the court characterized the proposed ban as a “ban”, but the
government treated it a series of actions to reduce WeChat’s functionality
and data collection that “do not directly prohibit the downloading and use”
of the app but “ultimately make [it] less effectively and challenging” to
use.103
Second, the court engaged in extensive probing of the scope of the ban
and the alternative means to achieve the end-goals, but the government
hoped for a more deferential court.104 Indeed, the government briefs
repeatedly cited two national security cases, Haig v. Agee and Holder v.
Humanitarian Law Project to suggest that the government’s interests are of
the highest importance, that the measures are prospective, and that the court
should defer to the government’s judgment.105 However, in WeChat I, the
court seemed to give credit only to the “overarching” national security
interests at stake, which it suggests are “certainly” significant, but did not
credit the government’s specified WeChat-related national security risks. In
the related question on alternative means of TPM restrictions, the
government also hoped for a deferential court, citing Trump v. Hawaii to
caution the court not to second guess or substitute its own assessment for that

101. Id.
102. See id.
103. Id.
104. See Opp’n to Renewed Mot. for Prelim. Inj. at 7–8, WeChat, 488 F. Supp. 3d 912 (No. 20-cv05910-LB) (ECF No. 51).
105. id.; see also Opp’n to Mot. for Prelim. Inj. at 26–30, WeChat, 488 F. Supp. 3d 912 (No. 20-cv05910-LB) (ECF No. 22).
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of the Executive.106 However, in both decisions, the court put a stronger
emphasis on the burden of evidentiary support on the government’s side to
show why the proposed ban was not substantially overbroad, and found the
government to have failed that in both decisions.
While the court’s intrusive probing of the national security justifications
might be problematic, and the appellate court might overturn it if given the
opportunity,107 it does show that the measure was a constitutionally novel but
dubious and a court might put the government on the spot to show that the
mean justifies the end.
To its credit, the government’s justifications are consistent throughout
the litigation process, where it maintained, generally, that the continued
functioning of WeChat in the United States would deprives user privacy and
data security, facilitates censorship and surveillance, sows misinformation
and propaganda, and assists espionage and intelligence activities. These
identified risks generally track the Trump Administration’s identified issues
in the internet sector, where it focused on three parts of issues: data security
and privacy, surveillance and intelligence, disinformation and censorship.
However, one particular issue that was not explicitly addressed by the
government in the WeChat case but was evident in the broader policy debate
was the issue of economic security.
1. Cyber Exploitation
The Trump Administration has been more active in enacting a national
security focused “cyber” policy. Given the raising awareness of the issue
after frequent cyberattacks by foreign state and non-state adversaries, against
both the government and private entities, a more active government response
is urgently needed.108 Both attacks that predate the Trump Administration,
including the hack of the Office of Personnel Management networks, and
attacks that happened during the Trump Administration, including the recent
SolarWinds hack, continued to show significant gaps in the government’s
ability to effectively deal with cybersecurity issues.109
106. Opp’n to Mot. for Prelim. Inj. at 26–30, WeChat, 488 F. Supp. 3d 912 (No. 20-cv-05910-LB)
(ECF No. 22).
107. See Dorothy Atkins,, 9th Cir. Weighs Nat’l Security, Free Speech in WeChat Appeal, LAW360
(Jan. 14, 2021), https://www.law360.com/articles/1345133/9th-circ-weighs-nat-l-security-free-speechin-wechat-appeal. Some members of the Ninth Circuit panel seemed to want to find in favor for the
WeChat plaintiffs under IEEPA grounds, but looked skeptical of the district court.
108. See Wade H. Atkinson, A Review of the Trump Administration’s National Cyber Strategy: Need
for Renewal and Rethinking of the Public-Private Partnership in U.S. National Security Policy, INST. OF
WORLD POLITICS (Oct. 22, 2020), https://www.iwp.edu/active-measures/2020/10/22/a-review-of-thetrump-administrations-national-cyber-strategy-need-for-renewal-and-rethinking-of-the-public-privatepartnership-in-u-s-national-security-policy/; see also U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., Summary of Department of
Defense Cyber Strategy 1 (Sept. 18, 2018), https://media.defense.gov/2018/Sep/18/2002041658/-1/1/1/CYBER_STRATEGY_SUMMARY_FINAL.PDF.
109. See Brendan I. Koerner, Inside the Cyberattack That Shocked the US Government, THE WIRED
(Oct. 23, 2016), https://www.wired.com/2016/10/inside-cyberattack-shocked-us-government/; Dina
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In its 2017 National Security Strategy, the Administration identified
“Keep America Safe in the Cyber Era” as a key theme of its first pillar of
national strategy to protect American people and homeland, and emphasized
cyberspace as an area to enhance defense capabilities, along with military,
defense industry, nuclear, space and intelligence capabilities.110 The
Administration also published the first National Cyber Strategy in more than
15 years in 2018.111 Using the same four-pillar approach in the National
Security Strategy, the document recognized the “growing centrality” of
cyberspace to America’s financial, social, government and political life,
reviewed cyberattacks by foreign nation-state adversaries, terrorists and
criminals, and committed to actions to address cyber threats and protect U.S.
cyberspace.112 It emphasized the importance of strengthening and
safeguarding federal networks and critical infrastructure, combat and deter
foreign espionage and intelligence, promote internet freedom and internet
governance, and foster a vibrant and resilient U.S. digital economy.113
Threats in the cybersecurity arena often arise from hacking, malware,
network intrusion, and other forms of cyber-attacks, targeting managed
service providers (MSPs), government networks, and even critical
infrastructure.114 These concerns were central to Trump’s finding in
Executive Order 13873, where it provided that “foreign adversaries are
increasingly creating and exploiting vulnerabilities in information and
communications technology and services, which store and communicate vast
amounts of sensitive information, facilitate the digital economy, and support
critical infrastructure and vital emergency services, in order to commit
malicious cyber-enabled actions, including economic and industrial
espionage against the United States and its people.”115
The involvement of nation-state actors who are foreign adversaries of
the United States make the issue of cyber exploitation of U.S. persons more
Temple-Raston, A “Worst Nightmare” Cyberattack: The Untold Story of the SolarWinds Hack, NPR
(Apr. 16, 2021), https://www.npr.org/2021/04/16/985439655/a-worst-nightmare-cyberattack-the-untoldstory-of-the-solarwinds-hack.
110. See THE WHITE HOUSE, National Security Strategy of the United States of America, (Dec. 2017),
12, 31, https://trumpwhitehouse.archives.gov/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/NSS-Final-12-18-20170905.pdf.
111. Atkinson, supra note 108.
112. See THE WHITE HOUSE, National Cyber Strategy of the United States of America (Sept. 2018),
1–3, https://trumpwhitehouse.archives.gov/wp-content/uploads/2018/09/National-Cyber-Strategy.pdf.
113. See id.
114. See, e.g., CYBERSECURITY & INFRASTRUCTURE SEC. AGENCY, U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC.,
Chinese Malicious Cyber Activity, https://us-cert.cisa.gov/china (last visited Apr. 6, 2021); Alex
Marquartdt et al., Florida Water Treatment Facility Hack Used a Dormant Remote Access Software,
Sheriff Says, CNN (Feb. 10, 2021),
https://www.cnn.com/2021/02/10/us/florida-water-poisoncyber/index.html; David E. Sanger, Russian Hackers Broke Into Federal Agencies, U.S. Officials Suspect,
N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 13, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/12/13/us/politics/russian-hackers-usgovernment-treasury-commerce.html.
115. Securing the Information and Communications Technology and Services Supply Chain, 84 Fed.
Reg. 22689 (May 17, 2019).
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significant. Digital extortion of military officers are a primary example.116
In the Grindr acquisition, one of the reported concerns for CFIUS is the
potential exploitation by Chinese state actors against US military or
government personnel.117 Another example would be the using of social
media to acquire information from government contractors.118 These
concerns are expressed not just by the intelligence community, but by
congressional leaders as well.119
Recently updated national security laws have also demonstrated
prominent concerns over these issues. In addition to the authority to regulate
foreign investment over or near critical infrastructure, FIRRMA specifically
added the sensitive personal data provision.120 Although the FIRRMA
reforms do not pre-date the rising awareness of privacy as a national security
concerns, it certainly helps crystalize the understanding of the government
regulators on how to deal with foreign access to U.S. user data.
One of the benefits of the WeChat and TikTok debate is that it elevates
the status of data privacy issue as an issue of national security.121 While the
debate has been prominent in the past due to cases of cyber-attacks,
economic espionages, and foreign intelligence activities, the debate has been
expanded to foreign access to U.S. user data through backdoors and kill

116. See DEF. SEC. SERV. & NAT’L COUNTERINTELLIGENCE & SEC. CTR., Cyber Threats,
https://www.dcsa.mil/Portals/91/documents/pv/mbi/Cyber_Threats.pdf (last visited Apr. 6, 2021);
CYBERSECURITY & INFRASTRUCTURE SEC. AGENCY, U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., Ransomware
Guidance & Resources, https://www.cisa.gov/ransomware (last visited Apr. 6, 2021).
117. See Sarah B. Danzman & Geoffrey Gertz, Why is the U.S. Forcing a Chinese Company to Sell
the
Gay
Dating
App
Grindr,
WASH.
POST
(Apr.
3,
2019),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2019/04/03/why-is-us-is-forcing-chinese-company-sell-gaydating-app-grindr/.
118. See Catalin Cimpanu, FBI Warning: Foreign Spies Using Social Media to Target Government
Contractors, ZERO DAY NET (June 18, 2019), https://www.zdnet.com/article/fbi-warning-foreign-spiesusing-social-media-to-target-government-contractors/; see also Press Release, Off. of Dir. of Nat’l Intel.,
FBI And NCSC Release New Movie to Increase Awareness of Foreign Intelligence Threats on
Professional Networking Sites and other Social Media Platforms (Sept. 29, 2020),
https://www.dni.gov/index.php/ncsc-newsroom/item/2145-nevernight-pressrelease#:~:text=%E2%80%9CSocial%20media%20deception%20continues%20to,said%20NCSC%20
Director%20William%20Evanina.
119. See NAT’L COUNTERINTELLIGENCE AND SECURITY CTR, Unclassified NCSC Info for Re. Lynch
(July
10,
2020),
https://oversight.house.gov/sites/democrats.oversight.house.gov/files/Unclassified%20NCSC%20Info%
20for%20Rep%20Lynch_0.pdf; OFF. OF U.S. REP. STEPHEN F. LYNCH, Chairman Lynch Seeks Info on
Foreign
Entities
Accessing
U.S.
Mobile
Application
Data
(Dec.
13,
2019),
https://lynch.house.gov/2019/12/chairman-lynch-seeks-info-foreign-entities-accessing-us-mobileapplication-data.
120. See Austin Mooney, Spotlight on Sensitive Personal Data as Foreign Investment Rules Take
Force, 10 NAT’L L. REV. 49 (2020).
121. See Mishaela Robison & Jack Karsten, What the Debate Over TikTok Means for the Future of
Social
Media,
BROOKINGS
INST.
(Oct.
12,
2020),
https://www.brookings.edu/blog/techtank/2020/10/12/what-the-debate-over-tiktok-means-for-thefuture-of-social-media/.
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switches through which state actors may access and exploit such data or
persons with such data.122
2. Economic Security
Economic security has been a recurring theme in the Trump
Administration’s cyber policy agenda. In the National Cyber Strategy, it
elevated economic security interest to the forefront of its policy agenda by
identifying “Promoting American Prosperity” as one of the four pillars of its
strategies. Specifically, it identified three focal points for actions—foster a
vibrant and resilient digital economy, foster and protect United States
ingenuity, and develop a superior cybersecurity workforce.123
Now of these focal points, on its face, seems to fit into the traditional
realm of national security considerations, and it was not reflected in the
WeChat litigation either. However, as with other areas of national security
actions taken by the Administration, the Federal Government during the past
four years have often incorporated industrial policy considerations into its
national security policy agenda. Setting aside the question on whether or not
this is another attempt to hide the Administration’s America-First,
protectionist agenda in the name of “national security”, it does show a
willingness on the part of the government to take actions to protect and
facilitate a U.S. industry to thrive internationally.124
Moving beyond policy targets it set, the government seems to have kept
its words. Many of the Trump actions also had an industrial or economic
policy undertone that shift the conversation of national security to the issues
of economic security and industrial competitiveness. For example, Trump’s
Executive Order 13873 specifically cover transactions that “poses an undue
risk of sabotage to or subversion of the design, integrity, manufacturing,
production, distribution, installation, operation, or maintenance of
information and communications technology or services in the United
States”, as well as those that “poses an undue risk of catastrophic effects on
… the digital economy of the United States.”125 This is a theme confirmed
by the Department of Commerce’s Strategic Plan as well as Department of

122. See e.g., NAT’L COUNTERINTELLIGENCE AND SECURITY CTR, Unclassified NCSC Info for Re.
Lynch
(July
10,
2020),
https://oversight.house.gov/sites/democrats.oversight.house.gov/files/Unclassified%20NCSC%20Info%
20for%20Rep%20Lynch_0.pdf.
123. See THE WHITE HOUSE, National Cyber Strategy of the United States of America (Sept. 2018),
1–3, https://trumpwhitehouse.archives.gov/wp-content/uploads/2018/09/National-Cyber-Strategy.pdf.
124. See Keman Huang & Stuart Madnick, The TikTok Ban Should Worry Every Company, HARVARD
BUS. REV. (Aug. 28, 2020), https://hbr.org/2020/08/the-tiktok-ban-should-worry-every-company.
125. Securing the Information and Communications Technology and Services Supply Chain, 84 Fed.
Reg. 22689 (May 17, 2019).
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Homeland Security’s analysis on national security in the age of digital
economy.126
Whether or not the Biden Administration is going to beyond this
economic security argument, the Interim National Security Strategic
Guidance issued by the new Administration seems to suggest that at least
some of these policies will stay for the foreseeable future.127

IV. TIKTOK, IEEPA AND EXECUTIVE AUTHORITY
The government action also led to two additional adverse court
decisions against it under the IEEPA personal communication and
information material exceptions. These two decisions may prove
problematic in the future for the government if it attempts to restrict TMT
platforms under the IEEPA again, as the statute is not the only one with a
public information exception.128
A. TIKTOK
As noted by the district court in TikTok, under IEEPA, “the authority
granted to the President . . . does not include the authority to regulate or
prohibit, directly or indirectly either (a) the importation or exportation of
information or informational materials; or (b) personal communications,
which do not involve a transfer of anything of value.”129
By finding that the TikTok ban to be, at the very least, an indirect
regulation over information materials and personal communication, the
TikTok court found the government action to be ultra vire and in violation of
both IEEPA and the APA.130
In addition, in evaluating the balance of hardship and public interests
under a motion for preliminary injunction, the Court took note of the
necessity to “give deference to the Executive Branch’s ‘evaluation of the
facts’ and the ‘sensitive and weighty interests of national security and foreign
affairs’” and acknowledged that the Government advanced “ample evidence
that China presents a significant national security threat.” 131 However, it
found “specific evidence of the threat posed by Plaintiffs, as well as whether
126. U.S. DEP’T OF COM., U.S. Department of Commerce Strategic Plan 2018-2022: Helping the
American
Economy
Grow
19,
https://www.commerce.gov/sites/default/files/us_department_of_commerce_20182022_strategic_plan.pdf (last visited Apr. 6, 2020); U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC. & OFF. OF DIR. OF
NAT’L INTEL., Emerging Technology & National Security 10 (July 26, 2018),
https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/2018_AEP_Emerging_Technology_and_National_
Security.pdf.
127. See THE WHITE HOUSE, Interim Nat’l Sec. Strategic Guidance 20 (Mar. 2021),
https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2021/03/NSC-1v2.pdf.
128. See, e.g., Trading with the Enemy Act, Pub. L. No. 65–91, 40 Stat. 411 (1917).
129. See TikTok, 507 F. Supp. 3d at 102 (citing 50 U.S.C. §§ 1702(b)(1), (3)) (cleaned up).
130. See id. at 111.
131. See id. at 114.
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the prohibitions are the only effective way to address that threat, remains less
substantial.”132
However, the Court declined to rule against the Government based on
the scant evidence the Government advanced. Rather, on the issue of balance
of equity and public interests, the Court reiterated that the Government
cannot suffer any harm or sacrifice any public interest when a court enjoins
an “unlawful practice”.133
B. MARLAND
The Philadelphia District Court in Marland went further than TikTok.
To begin with, in Marland, the Government argued that the case to be
unreviewable, because: first, the cited authorities of IEEPA and the National
Emergency Act preclude judicial review; second, under the APA, the TikTok
ban was an action committed to agency discretion that preclude judicial
review. The Court rejected both arguments.
Then, similar to the TikTok decision, the Marland court found the
plaintiffs would likely succeed on the APA claim because IEEPA’s personal
communication and information material exceptions were clearly violated.134
Last, in evaluating the balance of hardship and public interests, the
Court sidestepped the Government’s proffered national security threats as
merely “hypothetical”, and IEEPA’s personal communication exceptions
represented a congressional judgment that “President’s ability to exercise his
IEEPA authority to respond to a national emergency does not extend to
actions that directly or indirectly regulate the importation or exportation of
informational materials.”135
C. BROADER IMPLICATIONS
If anything, the TikTok and Marland decisions may prove to be more
problematic for the Government than the WeChat decision, at least from a
short-term perspective.
First, the Marland court explicitly rejected the argument that the
government ban is not justiciable. While some of the regulatory authorities
mentioned in earlier sections of this article, such the President’s and CFIUS’
authorities to review transactions, are often nonjusticiable because of the
statutes’ non-reviewability clauses, there is no such a provision under the
IEEPA. Besides, the Marland court intentionally draws the distinction
between the President’s executive actions and the Secretary’s decisions by
suggesting that it was not reviewing “essentially political questions
surrounding the declaration or continuance of a national emergency” but
132.
133.
134.
135.

See id.
See id. at 115.
See Marland v. Trump, 498 F. Supp. 3d 624, 641 (E.D. Pa. 2020).
See id. at 642.
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“whether the actions taken pursuant to a national emergency comport with
the power delegated by Congress.” As such, future challenges over actions
from the Government’s decisions from the ICT Supply Chain EO, for
example, may be subject to judicial review.
Second, both courts provided clear and concise interpretation of
IEEPA’s personal communication and information material exceptions,
adding two more adverse precedents to a small but increasing number of case
laws in a less-tested area of law. By drawing analogies between TikTok
videos and “films”, “photographs”, “artworks”, “newswire feed”, the courts
found that delisting of a social media app amounts to prohibition of a foreign
newswire service. This analysis foreshadows future attempt to regulate
mobile apps and software that carries at least some non-commercial personal
communication and information materials.136
It is also important to note that under the ECRA, the IEEPA personal
communication exception is incorporated into the export control context.137
As such, any case law applying the IEEPA personal communication
exception would have the same interpretative effect on the ECRA.
Third, while the Government warned of a “IEEPA free zone” where
foreign adversaries would swamp U.S. with malign cyber actors and data
services, both courts suggested that such a free zone could exist by the design
of the statute and the Government cannot do anything about it, until the law
is revised.138

V. AFTERMATH
In June, the government informed the court that it would rescind the
two bans, and therefore would moot the court proceedings.139 This is
consistent with the approach the Biden Administration has taken in many
litigations it inherits from the Trump Presidency.140 Like the new
administration’s break from the Trump Administration in abandoning or
reversing course in the WeChat and TikTok cases, it had reversed course in
a slew of administrative and regulatory actions on issues ranging from
immigration, environment, labor, trade to antitrust.141 Like the past where
136. Note that under TikTok’s interpretation of 50 U.S.C. §§ 1702(b)(3), as along as at least some
personal communication has no economic value, such as the case of some messages on WeChat or some
videos on TikTok clearly would do, the personal communication exception would preclude bans like the
TikTok and WeChat ban. See TikTok, 507 F. Supp. 3d at 108.
137. See Export Control Reform Act of 2018, supra note 8, at § 1754.
138. See TikTok, 507 F. Supp. 3d at 108; Marland, 498 F. Supp. 3d at 641.
139. See David Shepardson, Biden administration asks courts to dismiss government appeals of
TikTok ruling, REUTERS (July 12, 2021), https://www.reuters.com/business/retail-consumer/us-askscourt-dismiss-government-appeal-tiktok-ruling-2021-07-12/.
140. See Lawrence Hurley, Biden pivots away from old court battles, helps ignite new ones, REUTERS
(Jan. 21, 2021), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-biden-court/biden-pivots-away-from-old-courtbattles-helps-ignite-new-ones-idUSKBN29Q2UH.
141. See id.
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new administration came in to reverse courses in regulatory actions with
pending litigations extended beyond a former administration, the reversal
would often resolve the underlying legal controversial at issue and therefore
allow the government to moot the pending litigations with cases dismissed
and opinions vacated.
Curiously, while the government chose to reverse the bans and seeks
dismissal, it has chosen not to seek a vacatur of the courts’ orders in any of
the district court litigations. In the TikTok litigations, it sought and secured
the courts’ dismissal of all district court and appellate court proceedings.142
However, because the court opinions are not vacated, they remain on the
book with limited but persuasive precedential value.143
Although the two bans were rescinded in an executive order,144 there
are some suggestion that the Biden Administration may continue to seek
other ways to limit WeChat and TikTok’s national security risks.145 But the
tumultuous history of the WeChat and TikTok bans and the complicating
judicial defeats may pose significant challenges for the Government beyond
the short-term.

VI. A TUMULTUOUS PAST AND A TROUBLED FUTURE
In his first year in office, President Biden has generally maintained the
status quo of his predecessor’s policies in the TMT sector, despite his
decision to abandon the WeChat and TikTok bans.
His Secretary of Commerce, Gina Raimondo, pledged to be “very
aggressive” against Chinese trade practices and to “play” both defense and
offensive against Chinese actions.146 In her confirmation hearing, she also
reiterated Biden’s whole-of-government approach against China, without
specifying what actions she would take on export control, trade remedies and
ICT supply chains.
On the ICT front, the Trump Administration enacted an Interim Final
Rules under the ICT Supply Chain Executive Order on the last day of the
administration, providing with the Commerce Secretary the authority to

142. See, e.g., U.S. WeChat Users All. v. Trump, No. 20-16908 (9th Cir. 2020); Marland v. Trump ,
No. 20-3322 (3d Cir. 2020); TikTok v. Trump , No. 20-05302 (D.C. Cir. 2020).
143. Contra Robert P. Deyling, Dangerous Precedent: Federal Government Attempts to Vacate
Judicial Decisions upon Settlement, 27 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 689 (1994). The most significant example
of this approach is the Supreme Court’s application of the Munsingwear vacatur to the Ninth Circuit’s
first travel ban decision. See Josh Blackman, A Nonchalant Conclusion to Trump v. IRAP, LAWFARE
(Oct. 13, 2020), https://www.lawfareblog.com/nonchalant-conclusion-trump-v-irap.
144. See Exec. Order No. 14,034, 86 Fed. Reg. 13423 (2021).
145. See John D. McKinnon & Alex Leary, U.S. Moving—Some Say Too Slowly—to Address TikTok
Security Risk, WALL ST. J. (Feb. 2, 2022), https://www.wsj.com/articles/tiktok-security-risk-china-biden11643807751.
146. See Jeanne Whalen, Biden’s Commerce Secretary Pick Pledges a Tough Line on Chin But
Doesn’t Detail How She’d Deal With Huawei, WASH. POST (Jan. 26, 2021),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2021/01/26/gina-raimondo-confirmation-china/.
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review and block any foreign-related services, platforms, and transactions
involving ICTs, defined to cover anything from mobile network software,
cable routers, fiber optical cables, cloud service platforms, drones, video
games, mobile apps, to quantum computing devices.147 The Biden
Administration not only allowed the measure to go into effect on March 22,
2021,148 but sought to expand the scope of the Rule in November 2021 to
cover “connected software applications”, including “software, a software
program, or a group of software programs, that is designed to be used on an
end-point computing device and includes as an integral functionality, the
ability to collect, process, or transmit data via the internet.”149
Significantly, the final rule has been interpreted by leading trade groups
to give “nearly unlimited authority” to the Commerce Department “to
intervene in virtually any commercial transaction between U.S. companies
and their foreign counterparts that involves technology, with little to no due
process.”150 This action, interpreted by the business community as
antithetical to the Biden Administration’s approach with industrial
innovation for the broad scope of that proposed rule and its promise to enact
a government-wide approach in dealing with foreign adversary like China,
seems to be consistent, though, with the administration’s effort to re-evaluate
its industrial policy with regards to supply chain worries.
Additionally, in the new Executive Order on June 11, 2021 calling for
an expansion of the final rule to cover “connected software applications”, it
also asks agencies to prepare a report on measures to “protect Americans’
sensitive data from foreign adversaries.”151 The Administration also
maintained an Office of Intelligence and Security within the Commerce
Department formed under the direction of the ICT Supply EO, under which
it had issued subpoenas and conducted investigations into several Chinese
technology companies, including e-Commerce Giant Alibaba’s cloud
service unit.152

147. See 15 C.F.R. § 7.3 (2021).
148. See John D. McKinnon, U.S. to Impose Sweeping Rule Aimed at China Technology Threats,
WALL ST. J. (Feb. 26, 2021), https://www.wsj.com/articles/u-s-to-impose-sweeping-rule-aimed-atchina-technology-threats-11614362435.
149. U.S. DEP’T OF COMM., Securing the Information and Communications Technology and Services
Supply Chain; Connected Software Applications, 86 Fed. Reg. 67379 (Nov. 26, 2021).
150. See David Shepardson & Karen Freifeld, U.S. Seeks Input on Licensing Rules for Information
Tech Security, REUTERS (Mar. 26, 2021), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-chinatelecommunications-idUSKBN2BI2QX.
151. See Exec. Order No. 14,034, 86 Fed. Reg. 13423 (2021).
152. See U.S. DEP’T OF COMM., U.S. Secretary of Commerce Gina Raimondo Statement on Actions
Taken
Under
ICTS
Supply
Chain
Executive
Order
(Mar.
17,
2021),
https://www.commerce.gov/news/press-releases/2021/03/us-secretary-commerce-gina-raimondostatement-actions-taken-under-icts; REUTERS, U.S. examining Alibaba’s cloud unit to determine whether
it poses a national security risk: Reuters, citing sources, CNBC (JAN. 19, 2022),
https://www.cnbc.com/2022/01/19/us-examining-alibabas-cloud-unit-for-national-security-risksreuters.html.
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However, as the Biden Administration continues to roll out its wholeof-government approach in countering foreign threat in the TMT sector, it
should bear in mind of the tumultuous history of the Trump era and avoid
the numerous pitfalls his predecessor experienced.
A. PATCHWORK OF GOVERNMENT REGULATORS AND POLICIES
Regulatory authorities in internet regulation of the Trump era fall within
different federal regulators. First, the Federal Communication Commission
continued to enjoy broad, independent authority to enact licensing and
transaction limits and take enforcement actions on foreign access to the
telecommunication sectors due to national security concerns.153 Second, the
Department of Commerce, under the ICT Supply Chain EO, enjoys the
authority to review any transaction involving ICTs, 154 with primary authority
delegated to the National Telecommunications and Information
Administration.155 It also enjoyed the authority, through the Bureau of
Industry and Security, in issuing export license and reviewing export
transactions involving U.S. technologies, including emerging and
foundational technologies.156 Third, the Department of Treasury chaired
CFIUS in reviewing FDIs into the U.S. internet sectors.157 Lastly, other
agencies can also played significant role in these policy initiatives, including
the National Security Division of the Department of Justice in the Team
Telecom initiative,158 the Defense Technology Security Administration of

153. See, e.g., Communication Acts of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-416, § 214, 48 Stat. 1064, 1075 (1934);
John S. McCain National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2019, Pub. L. No. 115-232, § 889,
132 Stat. 1636, 1917 (2018); Secured and Trusted Communications Networks Acts of 2019, Pub. L. No.
116-124, §§ 2, 4, 134 Stat. 158, 158, 160 (2020).
154. See Exec. Order No. 13,873, 84 Fed. Reg. 22689 (2019).
155. See Josephine LeBeau et al., Take Two: Another Executive Order Addresses U.S. Personal Data
Concerns by Prohibiting Business with Companies That Develop or Control Eight Specified Applications
with Connections to China, JDSUPRA (Jan. 7, 2021), https://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/take-twoanother-executive-order-4209045/; NAT’L TELECOMM. & INFO. ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T OF COM., NTIA
Announces
Supply
Chain
Information-Sharing
program
(July
8,
2020),
https://www.ntia.doc.gov/blog/2020/ntia-announces-supply-chain-information-sharing-program; NAT’L
TELECOMM.
&
INFO.
ADMIN.,
U.S.
DEP’T
OF
COM.,
ICT
Supply
Chain,
https://www.ntia.doc.gov/category/ict-supply-chain (last visited Mar. 12, 2020).
156. See John R. Shane & Lori E. Scheetz, Commerce Publishes new Controls on Emerging
Technologies, WILEY REIN LLP (Oct. 7, 2020), https://www.wiley.law/alert-Commerce-Publishes-NewControls-on-Emerging-Technologies.
157. See U.S. DEP’T OF TREASURY, The Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States
(CFIUS), https://home.treasury.gov/policy-issues/international/the-committee-on-foreign-investmentin-the-united-states-cfius (last visited Apr. 6, 2021).
158. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, The Committee for the Assessment of Foreign Participation in the
United
States
Telecommunications
Services
Sector
(updated
Apr.
23,
2020),
https://www.justice.gov/nsd/committee-assessment-foreign-participation-united-statestelecommunications-services-sector-0.
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the Department of Defense in the CFIUS review process, 159 and the Cyber
and Infrastructure Security Agency of the Department of Homeland Security
in the ICT Supply Chain risk assessment initiatives. 160
While the CFIUS process and the Team Telecom initiative will help
foster better communications and policymaking in regulating the internet
sector, it is still too early to say if Biden Administration will bring a wholeof-government perspective into the fight against foreign exploitation of
social media platforms and content.
B. CONTRADICTORY TOWARDS FIRST AMENDMENT VALUE
Amici briefs filed by the Internet Society and EFF with the appellate
courts ask the courts to rule against the government, because of the broad
prior restraint implications of the cases, especially in the domestic context.161
Some of these amici seem to point towards potential dangerous domestic
implications of the government far-reaching interpretation and application
of national emergency law, given that all the proposed ban requires is a
foreign nexus of the platform. Some of these amici briefs even equate the
proposed bans with the prior restraint in the Pentagon Papers case—citing
national security to limit the free flow of speech. The government disagreed
in an answer to Judge Ryan Nelson’s question in the WeChat oral argument,
suggesting that they do not have any power to regulate domestic social media
platforms, even when a group of domestic users attempt to use a social media
app to overthrow the government.162
However, setting aside the question on the broader domestic
implications of the proposed bans, the WeChat and TikTok bans were also
inconsistent with the pronounced policy of the Trump Administration. In the
National Cyber Strategy, the government repeatedly emphasized the
importance of promoting internet freedom on the world stage. However, it
would only seem more ironic that the most landmark action the Trump
Administration has taken at the end of its four-year term was one of the most
159. See DEF. TECH. SEC. ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., Committee on Foreign Investment in the
United States (CFIUS), https://www.dtsa.mil/SitePages/assessing-and-managing-risk/committee-onforeign-investement-in-us.aspx (last visited Apr. 6, 2021).
160. See CYBERSECURITY & INFRASTRUCTURE SEC. AGENCY, U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC.,
Information & Communications Technology Supply Chain Risk Management (SCRM),
https://www.cisa.gov/supply-chain (last visited Apr. 6, 2021).
161. See Dkt. No. BL-51, U.S. WeChat All. v. Trump, No. 20-16908 (9th Cir. Dec. 4, 2020); Dkt.
No. BL-29, Marland v. Trump, No. 20-03322 (3rd. Cir. Jan. 22, 2021); Keman Huang & Stuart Madnick,
The TikTok Ban Should Worry Every Company, HARV. BUS. REV. (Aug. 28, 2020),
https://hbr.org/2020/08/the-tiktok-ban-should-worry-every-company; Haille Laws, When Viral Videos
Become A National Security Threat: TikTok Inc. v. Trump, MINN. L. REV. ONLINE (Dec. 29, 2020),
https://minnesotalawreview.org/2020/12/29/when-viral-videos-become-a-national-security-threattiktok-inc-v-trump/.
162. Edvard Pettersson, WeChat Ban Urged by U.S. Gets Skeptical Review by Appeals Court,
BLOOMBERG (Jan. 14, 2021), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2021-01-14/wechat-ban-urgedby-u-s-gets-skeptical-review-by-appeals-court.
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restrictive and dramatic action ever taken by the Federal Government since
the Pentagon Papers case. This approach would only undermine the
government’s own credibility in promoting and advocating for freedom of
speech and internet freedom, while giving the foreign adversaries more
ammunition to attack internet freedom in their own countries.
C. LOSING CREDIBILITY
While neither the two district courts that ruled under IEEPA nor the
district court that ruled under the First Amendment interpreted it that way,
many commentators have serious doubts about the legitimacy of the national
security interests claimed by the government.163 Some view it as personal
revenge for TikTok and many other platforms’ popular revolt against his reelection campaign, specifically for the role K-pop fans and TikTok played in
tanking his Tulsa event turnout;164 others suggest the TikTok ban as a move
to Americanize the company.165 But what is clear is that the courts were
never fully convinced with the government’s on-the-surface justifications, at
least initially. The WeChat court did not go as far as plaintiffs wanted to call
it a content-based restrictions for the President’s alleged racial animus, but
acknowledged that “while the government has established that China’s
activities raise significant national security concerns — it has put in scant
little evidence that its effective ban of WeChat for all U.S. users addresses
those concerns.”166 After the setbacks in the WeChat proceedings, the
government prepared confidential filings for Judge Nichols in the D.C.
District Court to review ex parte, but the court did not give a better time to
the government by noting that although it “has provided ample evidence that
China presents a significant national security threat, although the specific
evidence of the threat posed by Plaintiffs, as well as whether the prohibitions
are the only effective way to address that threat, remains less substantial.” 167
A more important issue is that the court really did go into details in its
consideration of the government’s consideration of alternatives under the
narrowly tailoring prong of intermediate scrutiny. Several courts considered
the government’s proffered memo, drafted by an advisor to Commerce
163. See Brown, infra note 164; Zachary Karabell, Trump’s TikTok Policy Is Just a New Kind of
“Security
Theater”,
POLITICO
MAG.
(Sept.
15,
2020),
https://www.politico.com/news/magazine/2020/09/15/trumps-tiktok-policy-is-just-a-new-kind-ofsecurity-theater-415088.
164. See Abram Brown, Is This the Real Reason Why Trump Wants To Ban TikTok?, FORBES (Aug.
1, 2020), https://www.forbes.com/sites/abrambrown/2020/08/01/is-this-the-real-reason-why-trumpwants-to-ban-tiktok/.
165. See David Pierce, How Trump’s TikTok Ban Might Actually Work—Or Not, PROTOCOL (Aug. 1,
2020), https://www.protocol.com/tiktok-ban.
166. See U.S. WeChat All. v. Trump, 488 F. Supp. 3d 912, 927 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 19, 2020).
167. Todd Spangler, Trump Administration Likely Exceeded Legal Authority with TikTok Ban, Judge
Rule, VARIETY (Sept. 28, 2020), https://variety.com/2020/digital/news/trump-tiktok-ban-exceeded-legalauthority-ruling-1234785547/.
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Secretary Wilbor Ross, in which the advisor conceded the existence of other
less drastic alternatives.168 In fact, a Department of Homeland Security study
recommends banning the use of the app on the devices of government
agencies and critical infrastructure operators, and implement steps to address
data exposure risks, such as location-data exposures, rather than an outright
ban.169 That seems to be enough, for the court, to rule against the
government.
The government may have one disadvantage in its arguments—it was
hard to carve out a narrowly tailored restriction on the alleged cyber-security
and privacy concerns. One may argue that this is a self-imposed wound,
because the concerns were simply too speculative.170 However, the fact that
no similar measure has ever been adopted in the United States also
underscored the significance of the challenges and controversial nature of
the action. Regardless, the government still has the option in TikTok’s case
to address the fundamental issues through CFIUS.171
Another complicating factor in the WeChat case is that WeChat is a
social media platform with predominantly users from the Chinese American
and Chinese diaspora communities.172 As such, justifying reasonable
alternatives for the affected communities can be difficult, especially if the
platform offers Chinese-language services and plaintiffs characterize the
platform as one for Chinese American to communicate with people from
their mother land.
But in any case, because of the dramatic nature of the actions taken in
these two cases and the pretext national security justifications proffered,173

168. See Notice of Corrected Ex. in Support of Mot. to Stay, Ex. A, U.S. WeChat v. Trump, No. 3:20cv-05910-LB (N.D. Cal. Sept. 28, 2020) ECF. No. 76-1;see also U.S. WeChat All. v. Trump, No. 3:20cv-05910-LB, 2020 WL 6891820, at *8 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 24, 2020) (denying motion to stay injunction)
(rather than taking narrowly tailored approaches “such as barring WeChat from government devices” or
“adopting mitigation procedures like those in Tencent’s mitigation proposal and Joe Hildebrand’s best
practices about data security”, the restrictions “burden substantially more speech than is necessary to
further the government’s legitimate interests.”).
169. See id. at *1.
170. See Zachary Karabell, Trump’s TikTok Policy Is Just a New Kind of “Security Theater”,
POLITICO MAG. (Sept. 15, 2020), https://www.politico.com/news/magazine/2020/09/15/trumps-tiktokpolicy-is-just-a-new-kind-of-security-theater-415088; Neil Davey, While the DOJ Appeals the
Preliminary Injunction on President Trump’s TikTok Ban, the Administration’s National Security and
Privacy
Concerns
Seem
Unfounded,
JOLT
DIGEST
(Oct.
20,
2020),
https://jolt.law.harvard.edu/digest/while-the-doj-appeals-the-preliminary-injunction-on-presidenttrumps-tiktok-ban-the-administrations-national-security-and-privacy-concerns-seem-unfounded.
171. See Davey, supra note 170.
172. See U.S. WeChat Users All. v. Trump, 488 F. Supp. 3d 912 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 19, 2020).
173. For example, in Xiaomi v. Dep’t of Def., a federal judge found the Defense Department’s decision
to designate Xiaomi as a company linked to the Chinese military as an arbitrary and capricious, and
blocked the Department’s decision to force U.S. companies to stop invest in the Chinese smartphone
manufacturer. See Xiaomi v. Dep’t of Def., No. 21-280, 2021 WL 950144 (D.D.C. Mar. 12, 2021).
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the government lost, not just its two proposed bans but potentially its
credibility in the future.174
D. MOVING BEYOND THE PAST
Beyond the persuasive effect of the court decisions, the long-term effect
of the Trump Administration’s approach in these litigations will not and
cannot be easily eliminated.
What the two litigations reveal are two pairs of dilemma that the
government is faced with: on the one hand, it is emphasizing the importance
of privacy and data security against foreign adversaries; on the other hand,
its respect for U.S. users’ privacy and data security are lacking at best, and
legislative efforts by the Federal Government to protect user privacy are
nowhere near to be complete. Similarly, on the one hand, free speech
advocates are crying aloud against the government actions in WeChat and
TikTok; on the other hand, the government is complaining to the court that it
has no power to regulate social media absent a foreign nexus.
First, these bans provide courts with more ammunition and justification
to sidestep the justiciability and reviewability issues in the national security
context. Constitutional challenge over national security decision-making has
already been recognized by some courts. For example, the D.C. Circuit in
Ralls v. CFIUS determined that the courts could directly intervene in
constitutional challenges over national security determination processes of
CFIUS, citing a rarely cited exception for constitutional challenge over
agency action.175 The TikTok litigations opened further for administrative
law challenge over national security decisions. While the Marland and
TikTok courts did not challenge the underlying national security declarations
or the Executive Order, both courts did find that they have authority to

174. Trump Administration has lost about 77% of its regulatory and administrative moves. See
Roundup: Trump-Era Agency Policy in the Courts, INST. FOR POLICY INTEGRITY (last updated Apr. 1,
2021), https://policyintegrity.org/trump-court-roundup. As Professor Saikrishna Prakash wrote for
Harvard Law Review, as the Executive Branch stretched and strained its power, the courts would
intervene more. Sometimes, the government seems to be engaged in a self-contradictory battle:
“One imagines that lawyers receive recurring calls with the following directive: Find a plausible
(meaning non-laugh-inducing) legal argument that permits the President to take some act or adopt some
measure. If the argument prevails in court, fantastic. If the argument fails, at least we tried to advance the
President’s agenda. Moreover, we can spin any judicial defeat as a partisan decision that refused to credit
our winning arguments.” See Saikrishna B. Prakash, The Age of the Winning Executive: The Case of
Donald J. Trump, 134 HARV. L. REV. FORUM 141, 143 (2020).
However, the result may not necessarily be great for future administrations because of the frequent
court interventions. See, e.g., Lee Epstein & Eric A. Posner, The Decline of Supreme Court Deference to
the President, 166 U. PENN. L. REV. 829 (2018).
175. See Ralls v. CFIUS, 758 F.3d 296 (D.C. Cir. 2014). One of the most significant developments
of the Ralls decision is that the D.C. Circuit explicitly rejected the district court’s declination to take up
jurisdiction and cite to a narrow, historical exception for constitutional challenge over statutory provision.
See id. at 308 (citing Griffith v. FLRA, 842 F.2d 487, 494 (D.C. Cir. 1988); Ungar v. Smith, 667 F.2d
188, 193 (D.C. Cir. 1981)).

Spring 2022

DIGITAL WILD WEST

193

review whether the government actions are ultra vires against IEEPA. 176
These are the only two IEEPA decisions since Holy Land Foundation v.
Ashcroft where a court has recognized a cause of action under IEEPA. 177
However, the TikTok court went even further to hold that not only did TikTok
prevail under an ultra vires challenge under Section 706(2)(c) the
Administrative Procedures Act, but also did it prevail under an arbitrary and
capricious challenge under Section 706(2)(A).178
Second, it may put the government in a more difficult position to justify
their actions. In the case of WeChat, the court’s application of traditional
First Amendment jurisprudence in that case shows that courts, while not
directly putting their thumbs on the scale on the national security interests
asserted by the government, may and could read into the rationale to see if
there is a mismatch between the national security interests asserted and the
alternative government regulations or actions considered and rejected. This
could lead to increasing hostilities against government justifications and
more expansive review over government discretions.
Third, but probably most importantly, the WeChat and TikTok
decisions show the limit of government authority in safeguarding
informational national security at the cross sections of foreign ownership and
domestic usership. While the litigations and the ongoing ICT rulemaking
process highlight the pressing needs for congressional actions, how far can
congressional actions go remains another question.
For example, while congressional actions may help address some of the
problems, such as reforming the IEEPA personal communication exceptions
or instituting a permanent ICT review regime, it may not necessarily be able
to address any constitutional issue. Besides, congressional actions will
always lag behind the rapid changes of national security challenges in the
information and communication sectors. In the national security context, it
took more than a decade for Congress to completely revamp the CFIUS
review regime, and four decades to revamp the Export Control regimes.
Another issue that will be front-and-center in the future congressional
debates on ChinaTech or foreign social media platforms is the issue of
privacy. Congress has been actively discussing privacy legislations for more
than half a decade. If and when it does pass a national landmark privacy
protection legislation, the issue of national security will likely come up.
There are more questions than answers on how national security interests
may be balanced against privacy interests, especially if a federal legislation
176. The government did raise reviewability issue in both Marland and TikTok, but both courts cite
to Section 706(2)(C) of the Administrative Procedure Act for reviewing ultra vires actions and found that
the government’s actions in the TikTok ban context were ultra vires and in direct violation of the
command of IEEPA. See Marland v. Trump, 498 F. Supp. 3d 624 (E.D. Pa. 2020); TikTok Inc. v. Trump,
507 F. Supp. 3d 92 (D.C. Cir. 2021).
177. See Holy Land Found., 333 F.3d at 172.
178. See TikTok, 507 F. Supp. 3d at 92.
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will provide more rights and safeguards for individuals, such as a right to be
forgotten or limitation on government access to private data. Can the
government restricts, prohibits or conditions foreign ownership or access to
U.S. user data? Can the government, for example, prohibits newly-emerged
Chinese fashion site Shein from accessing the U.S. market? Can the
government ask networking app Clubhouse to drop its Chinese audio
technology provider?
While we know that the government has temporarily lost the battle
against WeChat and TikTok, for U.S. users like you and me, we are still left
in a digital wild west, where national security risks remain unaddressed, and
free speech remain under attack.

